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Rights-of-Way Redux... Redux
Gardner F. Gillespie* and Paul A. Werner III**
Introduction

I.

This is the third installment printed in the Dickinson Law Review
addressing the fees that local governments may permissibly charge
wireline telecommunications and cable television companies 1 for use of
public rights-of-way. The Fall 2002 issue of the Law Review led off with
an article by Gardner Gillespie: Rights-of-Way Redux: Municipal Fees
on Telecommunications Companiesand Cable Operators(Rights-of-Way
William Malone, who has represented a number of
Redux).2
municipalities on what he calls this "hotly contested question,"3 offered a
response in the Winter 2003 issue: Municipalities' Right to Full
Compensation for Telecommunications Providers' Uses of the Public
This
Rights-of-Way (Municipalities' Right to Full Compensation).
article serves as a brief reply.
Rights-of-Way Redux was an effort to bring some clarity to the
swirling debate about municipal wireline fees. Municipalities across the
country today are increasingly supplementing their general fund revenues
by imposing fees on wireline companies for use of public rights-of-way. 5
*

Partner, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C. (gfgillespie@hhlaw.com).

J.D., Virginia Law School; B.A., Williams College (History).
**
Associate, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C. (pawerner@hhlaw.com).
J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles
(English).
1. For the convenience of the reader, this article will use the term "wireline
companies" when referring both to wireline telecommunications and cable companies.
Redux:
Municipal Fees on
F.
Gillespie,
Rights-of-Way
2. Gardner
Telecommunications Companiesand Cable Operators, 107 DICK. L. REV. 209 (2002).
3. Mr. Malone acted as counsel in T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618
(6th Cir. 2000), Bell Atlantic-Maryland v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805
(D. Md. 1999), vacated and remandedfor consid, of state law issues, 212 F.3d 863 (4th
Cir. 2000), and City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000),
among other cases. See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
4. William Malone, Municipalities' Right to Full Compensation for
Telecommunications Providers' Uses of the Public Rights-of-Way, 107 DICK. L. REV.
623, 636 (2003).
5. Gillespie, supra note 2, at 209.
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The fees demanded by the municipalities typically take the form of a
percentage of the wireline companies' gross revenues. 6 As consumers
embrace the new communications services offered by wireline
companies, the municipalities are pocketing substantial dollar amounts. 7
This development has caused a surge in litigation between wireline
companies and municipalities, litigation that has not yet finally resolved
itself into a coherent legal doctrine. 8 But many of the issues involved
have a familiar ring. 9 Municipalities in the nineteenth century similarly
attempted to extract crippling tolls from the telephone and telegraph
companies that used the public roads to run their wires.10 And these
efforts were eventually quieted by the courts."1
Rights-of-Way Redux begins with a look back to the nineteenth
century, both to examine the accepted unique and limited nature of
municipalities' ownership rights in their streets and to analyze carefully
the often-misread 1893 Supreme Court decision of City of St. Louis v.
Western Union Telegraph Co. (St. Louis 1). 12 In his initial opinion in the
case, 13 Justice Brewer, writing for the Court, suggested for the first time
that municipalities may exact "rental" from telecommunications
companies for the use of their streets. 14 Yet his pronouncement was
made without the benefit of briefing on the issue, 15 and he was
apparently unaware of the accepted common law notion that
municipalities own their streets only in trust for the public, and have no
rights to rent or sell them. 16 In his opinion on rehearing two months later
(St. Louis 1),7 the Court retreated from the rental theory, and fell back
on the accepted doctrine that municipal fees were properly limited to
regulatory costs. 18
Having thus set the stage, the article then moves on to a discussion
of the current federal statutes that further limit municipal ability to exact
revenue-generating fees from wireline companies.19 The article argues in
conclusion that the current municipal efforts to "pluck the golden goose
6. Id.
7. Id. at 210.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 210-11.
10. Id.
11. ld. at 212.
12. 148 U.S. 92 (1893) [hereinafter St. Louis I], reh'g denied, 149 U.S. 465 (1893)
[hereinafter St. Louis I1];
see also Gillespie, supra note 2, at 213-26.
13. St. Louis 1, 148 U.S. 92.
14. Id. at 99.
15. See Gillespie, supra note 2, at 218 & n.57.
16. See id. at 214 & nn.21-28.
17. St. Louis II, 149 U.S. 465.
18. Id. at 470-71; see also Gillespie, supra note 2, at 221-22.
19. 47 U.S.C. §§ 253, 542 (2001); see Gillespie, supra note 2, at 233-54.
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of new telecommunications and cable services," like the similar efforts
of the municipalities to extract huge fees from the telephone and
telegraph industries towards the end of the nineteenth century, are bound
to fail. °
In response, Mr. Malone chooses largely to take the debate in other
directions. He spends a considerable amount of his analysis discussing
what he believes is a change in the historical regulatory compact between
regulators and telecommunications utilities, though he does not establish
how this discussion is relevant to the issue of municipal fees. 2' He also
suggests, without support, that the historical nature of municipal street
ownership has been changed by the proliferation of "home rule"
statutes,22 and he argues that municipalities are permitted by the Fifth
Amendment 23 and required by state "anti-donation" laws to exact high
fees for street usage.24 Finally, Mr. Malone presents a newly minted
interpretation of the legislative history of section 253 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.25
This article will attempt to refocus and, hopefully, to close the
debate. As discussed below, the historical perspective offered in Rightsof-Way Redux is necessary to understand the issues. Neither Mr.
Malone's discussion of the changing nature of the regulatory compact
nor his reference to the increased number of home rule states contributes
meaningfully to the debate. Even were Mr. Malone correct that the
Telecommunications Act implicates just compensation principles, the
amount that would be due would be nominal. And, finally, Mr. Malone's
unusual reading of the legislative history of section 253 is incorrect and
has never been accepted by any of the dozens of courts that have
interpreted the section.
II. The Importance of a Proper Historical Perspective
Mr. Malone's criticism of Rights-of-Way Redux for relying on older
cases26 is disingenuous, considering the positions that he has taken on
behalf of his municipal clients in a number of cases. Indeed, it was Mr.
Malone and his law firm that successfully convinced the court in T.C.G.
Detroit v. City of Dearborn27 that the 1893 Supreme Court decision in St.

20.

See Gillespie, supra note 2, at 250-51.

21. Malone, supra note 4, at 627-29.
22. Id. at 630.
23. Id.at 635, 638.
24. Id. at 631-32.
25. Id. at 636-37.
26. Id. at 626 ("[T]he first thing one notices about the statutes and cases cited by Mr.
Gillespie is their age.").
27. 16 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Louis I established that municipalities have the right to rent their
streets.2 8 Mr. Malone has continued to advocate that position in later
cases.' 9 Only in the face of the demonstration in Rights-of-Way Redux
that St. Louis I's use of a rental analysis was quickly discarded on
rehearing in St. Louis J/,30 and was then absent from the ten other
Supreme Court decisions considering municipal fees over the next
twenty-five years, does Mr. Malone suggest that these older cases have
gone bad with age.
Indeed, Mr. Malone makes little effort in Municipalities' Right to
Full Compensation to defend the view of St. Louis I reflected in his
briefs. He issues a single ex cathedra interpretation of St. Louis II,
attempting to shoehorn the Court's statement that "regulation" could
include some right to require payment to "regulate the use" of the streets
into an "affirmation of the City's power under state law to charge rent.'
Mr. Malone chooses to ignore altogether the numerous other cases over
the next three decades in which the Court analyzed municipal wireline
fees solely
on the basis of whether they were justified to meet regulatory
32
costs.

Instead of focusing on the St. Louis cases and the failure of the
Supreme Court to approve a "rental" analysis in later decisions, Mr.
Malone spends the bulk of his article on discussions of the change in the
regulatory compact that he believes is reflected in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the home rule movement.33 But,
whatever the Telecommunications Act may say about the diminished
role of natural monopoly theory in telecommunications regulation, a

28. Mr. Malone was one of the counsel for the City of Dearborn. Id. at 786.
29. In the motion to dismiss that Mr. Malone filed on behalf of his client in Bell
Atlantic-Maryland,Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Md. 1999),
vacated and remandedfor consid of state law issues, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000), he
relied heavily on the St. Louis I opinion to support his claim that "[t]he ability of local
governments to obtain compensation for use of their streets has long been recognized by
the courts." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss at 17-18, Bell
AtL-Md., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 805 (No. 4187). Quoting from St. Louis I, Mr. Malone
argued that the compensation sought by local governments for use of public rights-ofway "is more in the nature of a charge for the use of property belonging to the city-that
which may properly be called rental. It is a demand of proprietorship." Id. at 17 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Brief for Appellant at 12, City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel.
Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind.2000) (No. 45A03-9808-CV-333).
30. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465 (1893) [hereinafter St.
Louis 11];
Gillespie, supra note 2, at 221-22.
31. Malone, supra note 4, at 632 (quoting St. Louis H, 149 U.S. at 468-70). As
noted in Rights-of-Way Redux, this statement by the Court merely recognized the right of
municipalities to charge a fee to cover the possible cost of Western Union's right-of-way
use to other possible users. Gillespie, supra note 2, at 220-21.
32. Gillespie, supra note 2, at 222.
33. Malone, supra note 4, at 627-30, 635-38.
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position with which these authors fundamentally agree, that issue simply
has nothing to do with the common law limitations on municipal street
ownership. Nor do home rule statutes affect the limited nature of
municipal street ownership. Mr. Malone does not explicitly addressand it is unclear whether he disputes-the historical understanding that
streets are held in trust for the public and, unlike other municipal
property, are owned in a "governmental" and not a "proprietary"
capacity.34
Mr. Malone believes that the trend toward municipal home rule is a
"potent" and "universal" reason for dismissing older rights-of-way cases
as "no longer predictive of present-day state law." 35 To support his
claim, Mr. Malone chooses to rely principally on a case in which he
represented the municipality, City of Gary v. Indiana Bell Telephone
Company, Inc.36 But the Gary case actually hurts his cause. Addressing
the question whether the city had authority to impose revenue-based fees
for use of its rights-of-way, the court initially took note of Indiana's
Home Rule Act of 1980. 37 According to the court, the act "abrogated the
traditional rule that local governments possessed only those powers
expressly authorized by statute and declared that a local government
possesses '[a]ll other powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of its
affairs.' ' 38 The court's inquiry did not end there, however.
Indiana's home rule statute did not answer the question before the
court. As the court made plain, it was "faced with deciding whether the
[revenue-based] fee was within Gary's broad grant of powers conferred
on it by the Home Rule Act." 39 To grasp the scope of the powers
delegated to the city, the Gary court retreated to the common law.4 °
Unfortunately, the court accepted Mr. Malone's invitation to rely on the
misreading of the common law evident in St. Louis L 4 1 Based on St.
Louis I, the court concluded that a local government's powers include
"the unspecified power to operate in a proprietary capacity to charge fair
and reasonable compensation for the private, commercial use of these
34. As noted in City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River RailroadCo., 24
Iowa 455 (1868), and City of Des Moines v. Iowa Telephone Co., 162 N.W. 323 (Iowa
1917), municipal ownership interest in streets is unlike municipal ownership in "a market
house, a public hall or the like." City of Des Moines, 162 N.W. 323; City of Clinton, 24
Iowa 455. Whereas the municipal interest in the latter was like the ownership interest of
a private party, the ownership interest in streets, though held in fee simple, was merely a
governmental interest. See Gillespie, supra note 2, at 214-15.
35. Malone, supranote 4, at 630.
36. 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000).
37. Id. at 153.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153-54.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:4
,,42

public grounds, irrespective of the label placed on the compensation.
If the Gary court was aware of St. Louis II, and the Supreme Court's
failure to follow the rental theory in later cases, it is not evident.
Mr. Malone's interpretation of the home rule phenomenon must
thus be viewed suspiciously. The Indiana Supreme Court's reasoning in
Gary reveals that the trend does not, in fact, "represent[] a watershed,
such that pre-home rule cases on municipal property rights are no longer
unconditionally authoritative., 43 The Gary court actually looked right
past the Home Rule Act to the pre-home rule common law for authority
that "validated [the] city's power to charge rent" for use of its rights-ofway. 44 It is precisely this misunderstanding of the common law-and

misreading of the St. Louis opinions-that Rights-of-Way Redux seeks to
correct.4 5
Mr. Malone is not able to make the case that municipal home rule
by itself alters in any way the historical nature of municipal street
ownership.
Properly understood, home rule is simply a type of
municipal organization that gives local governments broad powers over
local concerns. 46 Home rule statutes may well have modernized the way
states relate to their political subdivisions, but they did not-as the Gary
case illustrates-reverse longstanding common law principles.4 7 The
issue is not about which governmental entities are vested with
"ownership" of the public roads; rather, the issue is whether ownership
of the public streets allows local governments to rent public rights-of-

way.48 Rights-of-Way Redux readily accepts that municipalities may be
afforded taxing power by their legislatures, sufficient to permit the

42.

Id. at 153.

43.
44.

Malone, supra note 4, at 630.
Id.;
see Gary, 732 N.E.2d at 153-54.

45. Gillespie, supra note 2, at 218-225.
46. See, e.g., Gary, 732 N.E.2d at 153 (stating that the home rule act "declared that a
local government possesses '[a]ll other powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of
its affairs').
See generally 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 1.40 (3d ed. 1995).
47. See, e.g., Gary, 732 N.E.2d at 153-54.
48. Mr. Malone's statement that early rights-of-way decisions have been "effectively
reversed by state legislative action" is incorrect. Malone, supra note 4, at 629. The
Maryland law on which he rests this claim uncontrovertibly passes title to the public
roads to the Maryland Board of County Road Commissioners and empowers the Board to
perform "duties as may be necessary to secure an efficient administration of the public
road system." Act of Apr. 12, 1904, ch. 591, § 285, 1904 Md. Laws 1006, 1008.
However, this piece of legislation is not responsive to the question whether
administration of public road systems allows local governments to rent use of the public
rights-of-way. Of similar effect are the cases cited by Mr. Malone for the point that
municipalities may hold title to their streets. See, e.g., Malone, supra note 4, at 630
nn.56, 63.
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imposition of local taxes on street usage. But, as recognized there, 49 and
also by Mr. Malone,50 seldom have states delegated that broad power to
their municipal governments.
Mr. Malone also suggests that state constitution "anti-donation"
clauses demand that public property not be given away without adequate
compensation.5 1 But he cites no authority for the proposition that these
constitutional limitations have any effect on the use of streets for the
52
The
public purpose of wireline communications activities.
constitutional provisions on which he relies are fully consistent with the
53
historical restrictions against the use of streets for non-public purposes.
But it has long been recognized that wireline use of the streets is a public
purpose. 54 Permitting wireline companies to place their wires above or
below the streets is not in any way a donation of public property.
III.

The Takings Clause Does Not Alter the Analysis Under Section
253

Mr. Malone appears to argue that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires that section 253 of the Communications Act not be
interpreted to prevent municipalities from imposing revenue-generating
fees on wireline companies.55 The split in the caselaw interpreting 47

49. Gillespie, supra note 2, at 226.
50. Malone, supra note 4, at 634.
51. Id. at631.
52. Wireline telecommunications and cable companies' use of public streets is
considered a "public purpose." See, e.g., Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real
Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600, 609 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that cable companies
are entitled to access easements dedicated to the public for general utility use) (citing
Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir.
1995)); Yale Univ. v. City of New Haven, 134 A. 268, 271 (Conn. 1926) (stating that use
of roads for public purposes includes placing telephone and telegraph wires above or
below ground); Bentel v. Bannock County, 656 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Idaho 1983) (noting
that "foreseeable" public uses of easements include "communications"); Williams
Telecomms. Co. v. Gragg, 750 P.2d 398, 402 (Kan. 1988) (approving use of eminent
domain power for public purpose of ensuring "[r]eliable high-speed transmission of
telecommunications"); Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 63 N.W. 111, 112 (Minn.
1895) (stating that "[t]he transmission of intelligence by telegraph or telephone" is a
"public use" of the roads); Smith v. Adams, 523 A.2d 788, 789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(holding that cable communications are a "public service" for which public streets may
be used); State ex rel. York v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 184 P.2d 577. 582 (Wash. 1947) (stating
that roads may be used for public purpose of telephone and telegraph lines); Herold v.
Hughes, 90 S.E.2d 451, 458 (W. Va. 1955) ("[P]ublic road purposes include[] all rights
and privileges necessary or convenient to the use of the public in travel or transportation
of properties of all kinds, under or along all public highways."). See generally 1I
McQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 30.159.
53. Gillespie, supra note 2, at 215.
54. See supra note 52.
55. Malone, supra note 4, at 635-36.
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U.S.C. § 253 is discussed extensively in Rights-of-Way Redux. 56 One57
line of cases, germinating from T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn,
relies on a misreading of St. Louis I to hold that municipalities may
obtain compensation in the form of "rent" under section 253. 58 The other
line, increasingly gaining favor, holds that "fair and reasonable"
compensation under section 253 is limited to regulatory costs. 59 Mr.
Malone argues that these latter cases do not adequately recognize the
requirements of the Takings Clause. 60 According to Mr. Malone, the
requirement of section 253 that municipalities must not prohibit
telecommunications companies from providing their services exacts a
"taking" which must be compensated.61
There is a serious question whether the indirect restriction contained
in section 253 against any "local legal requirement" that has "the effect
of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide ...telecommunications
service" effects a taking in the first place. 62 None of the numerous cases
56. Gillespie, supra note 2, at 233-46.
57. 16 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aft'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
58. See Gillespie, supra note 2, at 235-40.
59. City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1179-80 & n. 19 (9th Cir. 2001)
(stating that non-cost-based fees are objectionable), cert. denied sub. nom. City of
Tacoma v. Qwest Corp., 534 U.S. 1079 (2002); Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of
Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1100-01 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("Fees charged against
telecommunications carriers must be directly related to the carrier's actual use of the
local rights-of-way."); N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of West New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d
631, 637-38 (D.N.J. 2001) (stating more persuasive view is that municipalities are limited
to recouping "costs directly incurred through use of the public rights-of-way"), aff'd, 299
F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002); Bell Atl.-Md, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d
805, 817-19 (D. Md. 1999), vacated and remandedfor consid, of state law issues, 212
F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000); PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766,
1999 WL 1240941, at *6-9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999); AT&T Communications of the
Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin, 40 F. Supp. 2d 852, 855-56 (W.D. Tex. 1998), vacated
as moot, 235 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 2000); AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 593 (N.D. Tex. 1998); see also Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1251 (D.N.M. 2001). See generally
Gillespie, supra note 2, at 243-44. This view continues to gain adherents as more cases
are handed down. In the recent case of XO Missouri, Inc. v. City of Maryland Heights,
No. 4:99-CV-1052, 2003 WL 1838767 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2003), the Eastern District of
Missouri chose to side with this camp. Id. at *4-5 ("The Court adopts the reasoning
supporting other courts' decisions that revenue-based fees are impermissible under
[§ 253]."); cf Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, No. C 01-0 0663 SI,
2003 WL 1857631, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2003) (stating that city ordinances are not
saved by section 253(c)); City of Rome v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
2d 176, 181 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (declining to decide fee issue because "numerous
provisions of the Agreement" violated section 253(a)).
60. Malone, supra note 4, at 631, 635-36.
61. Id.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2001). It is doubtful whether government regulation that
requires municipalities to permit the use of public streets for one of their historical public
purposes can be deemed a "regulatory taking." Only if government "regulation goes too
far" will it be "recognized as a taking." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
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analyzing section 253 has held that the section effects a taking of
municipal property. But, were just compensation principles to apply,
they would not justify the revenue-generating fees that Mr. Malone
seeks.
Traditional takings law holds that just compensation is
63
determined by the loss sustained by the person whose property is taken;
the value of the property to the taker is not considered.64 As noted in
Rights-of-Way Redux, historical just compensation principles would thus
provide only nominal compensation to a street owner for the presence of
a wire along or under the street, because the wire would "not unduly
interfere with the [municipality's] use of the [right-of-way] for [other]
purposes.65
Judge Tjoflat recently discussed these just compensation principles
on behalf of the Eleventh Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v. FCC.6 6 His
analysis updates, but is wholly consistent with, the historic Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago67 case. Judge

(1922). The Supreme Court has generally "eschewed 'any set formula for determining"'
how far is too far, choosing instead to engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."
See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
(2002) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)); cf.Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1015 (stating that categorical treatment is appropriate when "land-use regulation
'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land') (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
Surely a regulation that prevents local governments only from thwarting wireline
companies' abilities to deliver telecommunications services does not go too far. See 47
U.S.C. § 253(c).
But see Jennifer L. Worstell, Note, Section 253 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Permanent Physical Appropriation of Private
Property That Must Be Justly Compensated, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 441, 467-74 (1998)
(stating that section 253 allows "telecommunications firms to permanently occupy the
rights-of-way of municipalities, which amounts to a Fifth Amendment Taking requiring
just compensation").
63. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1369 (11 th Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
64. Id.at 1370 ("But if we know one immutable principle in the law of just
compensation, it is that the value to the taker is not to be considered, only loss to the
owner is to be valued.") (quoting Metro. Transp. Auth. v. ICC, 792 F.2d 287, 297 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
65. Gillespie, supra note 2, at 241 (quoting Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v.
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 242 (1897)).
66. 311 F.3d 1357 (1 Ith Cir. 2002).
67. 166 U.S. 226, 242 (1897). Alabama Power Co. is consistent with the Supreme
Court's determination in United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984), that
municipal property is covered by the Takings Clause and generally subject to a fairmarket-value analysis. Malone, supra note 4, at 631. The Eleventh Circuit admitted that,
if it were deciding a traditional physical takings case, fair market value would typically
be the formula used to determine just compensation. Ala. Power Co., 311 F.3d at 1368.
The problem was that it was presented with a "unique" takings case. Id. at 1369.
Because the property at issue-pole space-was nonrivalrous, the court determined that
marginal cost, not fair market value, was an appropriate measure of just compensation.
Id. at 1369-70.
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Tjoflat reformulated the traditional principles in law and economics
terminology. In analyzing the arguments of electric utilities that the
Federal Pole Attachment Act required that just compensation be paid to
utilities for allowing cable operators to attach to utility poles, the court
determined that where the property taken was "nonrivalrous"-"[t]hat is,
the cable company's use does not foreclose any other use"-marginal
cost was adequate compensation. 68 Because the use of utility poles by
cable operators would not "diminish the use and enjoyment of [the poles
by] others," the court concluded that the utilities were due nothing more
than the marginal costs associated with attaching additional wires to their
poles.69 Similarly, the marginal cost of wireline companies ' use of
municipal streets is surely not greater in any measurable degree than the
regulatory costs to the municipality. Local governments' ability to
collect "fair and reasonable compensation" for wireline companies' use
of public rights-of-way under section 253 therefore satisfies the Takings
Clause's "just compensation" requirement.7 v
IV. The Legislative History of Section 253(c) Does Not Endorse GrossReceipt-Based Fees
Mr. Malone finds in the debate leading to passage by the House of
the Stupak-Barton amendment "unambiguous[]" proof that the Congress
"wrote subsection (c) [of section 253] in contemplation of gross-receiptsbased fees."'v A fair reading of this piece of legislative history, however,
does not support Mr. Malone's view. And mounting contrary precedent
signals that it is simply wrong.72 The most that can be reasonably
implied from passage of the amendment is that it was intended to allow
local governments to consider the varying regulatory burdens placed on
public rights-of-way by different telecommunications providers when
68.

Ala. PowerCo.,311 F.3dat 1369.

69. Id. at 1369-71. The court qualified its holding by adding that the analysis would
be different if the utility showed that a cable company's use of its poles foreclosed any
other use. Id. at 1370. The court explained that, in this scenario, the pole space would be
rivalrous-that is, the use of pole space by a cable operator would result "in a gain that
precisely corresponds to the loss endured by the other party." Id. at 1369. Before the
court would consider pole space to be a rivalrous good, however, a utility must
demonstrate that the pole in question is at full capacity and the utility is able to put the
space requested to a higher-valued use. Id. at 1369-71.
70. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2001). Courts that have addressed the municipal fees issue
have also indicated that section 253(c)'s "fair and reasonable compensation" is consistent
with the Takings Clause's "just compensation" language. See, e.g., N.J. Payphone Ass'n
v. Town of West New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (D.N.J. 2001) ("[A] fee that does
more than make a municipality whole is not compensatory in the literal sense ...
aff'd, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002).
71. See Malone, supra note 4, at 636.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 80-84.
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imposing usage fees.
The circumstances under which the amendment was passed
contradict Mr. Malone's claim that "[b]oth the proponents and opponents
of the House committee's version agreed that the language adopted
would permit gross-receipts-based fees. ' 7 3
The Stupak-Barton
amendment was offered to replace a provision that would have required
municipalities to charge different telecommunications providers the same
fees for use of rights-of-way.74
In offering the amendment,
Representative Stupak asserted that local governments must be permitted
to tailor the fees that they charge a given telecommunications provider to
the burden that the provider places on the rights-of-way. 75 According to
Representative Stupak, a municipality should be allowed to impose a
different fee on "a company that just wants to string a wire across two
streets to a couple of buildings" than one that "plans to run 100 miles of
76
trenching in our streets and wires to all parts of the cities.,
Representative Stupak claimed that under the existing provision
municipalities "cannot make that distinction. 77 The Stupak-Barton
amendment ultimately carried the day by a vote of 338-86. 78
This understanding of the legislative history has gained broad
acceptance in the courts. 79 By contrast, Mr. Malone stands essentially
73. Malone, supra note 4, at 637.
74. 141 CONG. REC. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stupak).
75. Id. ("Local governments must be able to distinguish between different
telecommunications providers.").
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at H8477.
79. See, e.g., N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of West New York, 299 F.3d 235, 246
n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) ("The authors' comments accompanying the introduction of their
amendment were primarily concerned with providing local governments with the
flexibility to vary charges based on the use of the rights of way."); T.C.G.N.Y., Inc. v.
City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that Congress
rejected "parity" provision by adopting Stupak-Barton amendment), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. 2003);
T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 792 (E.D. Mich. 1998) ("As can
be clearly seen from Representative Stupak's comments, the parity provision was
defeated because it did not allow a local government to distinguish between providers
based on their varying use of the right-of-ways."), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000);
AT&T Communications of the Southwest v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 594 &
n.42 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (stating that parity provision was rejected because it required local
governments to charge the same fee to every telecommunications provider irrespective of
burden imposed on the rights-of-way); T.C.G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 977 F. Supp.
836, 840 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ("As can be clearly seen from Representative Stupak's
comments, the parity provision was defeated because it did not allow a local government
to distinguish between providers and impose a 'fair and reasonable rate' to providers
based on their use of the right-of-ways."), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); GST
Tucson Lightwave, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 950 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Ariz. 1996) (stating
that the "amendment constituted rejection of the previously offered 'parity' provision").
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alone in his interpretation.' ° Of the many courts that have confronted the
issue, not one has countenanced Mr. Malone's interpretation of the
legislative history. 8' To the contrary, these courts have overwhelmingly
rejected it. The majority has done so implicitly, by holding that
subsection (c) does not allow municipalities to charge gross-receiptsbased fees. 2 Others have done so more directly, by agreeing with the
reading of the subsection's legislative history presented here. 3 For but
one example, take the recent case decided by the Eastern District of
Missouri, XO Missouri, Inc. v. City of Maryland Heights.

4

The XO

Missouri court explained that in holding that subsection (c) does not
allow municipalities to impose revenue-based
fees it was "persuaded by
85
the [subsection's] legislative history.,
Mr. Malone's analysis is further called into question by the fact that
even the few cases supporting his conclusion-that subsection (c) allows
municipalities to assess gross-receipts-based fees-have been unwilling
to embrace his view of the subsection's legislative history. 6 Of course,
80. Cf Worstell, supra note 62, at 475-76 ("On the whole, Congress did not give any
indication of what it thought was 'fair compensation'.....
81. See infra notes 83-84.
82. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Qwest Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1251 (D.N.M.
2001) (stating that amount of user fee must "directly relate to County's expenses incurred
in managing the actual physical use of the public right of way"); Qwest Communications
Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1100-01 (N.D. Cal. 2001); PECO
Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, No. 99-4766, 1999 WL 1240941, at *6-9 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 20, 1999); AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin, 40
F. Supp. 2d 852, 855-56 (W.D. Tex. 1998), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 241 (5th Cir.
2000); AT&T Communications of the Southwest v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593;
cf City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1180 & n. 19 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating
that non-cost-based fees are objectionable).
83. XO Mo., Inc. v. City of Maryland Heights, No. 99-CV-1052, 2003 WL 1838767,
at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2003); N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town of West New York, 130
F. Supp. 2d 631, 637-38 (D.N.J. 2001) (stating more persuasive view is that
municipalities are limited to recouping "costs directly incurred through use of the public
rights-of-way") (citing Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d
805, 817-19 (D. Md. 1999), vacated and remanded for consid of state law issues, 212
F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000)), aff'd, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002); Bell Atl-Md., Inc., 49 F.
Supp. 2d at 817-19 ("The legislative history further supports the conclusion that the
purpose of section 253(c) is to enable local governments to recoup their investments in
public rights-of-way by imposing 'fair and reasonable' user fees on telecommunications
companies, apportioned according to the companies' actual physical use of the rights-ofway.") (emphasis added) (citing 141 CONG REC. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Stupak)).
84. No. 4:99-CV-1052, 2003 WL 1838767, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2003).
85. Id.at *5.
86. See Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1257-59 (D. Or.
2002); T.C.G.N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81, 95-98 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 71
U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. 2003); Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Port Auth., No. 99CIV-0060, 1999 WL 494120, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999); T.C.G. Detroit v. City of
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there may well be a variety of legitimate reasons to explain why these
courts failed to rely on legislative history to bolster their holdings. A
review of these decisions, however, suggests an obvious explanation:
The courts did not believe that the legislative history is susceptible to the
interpretation Mr. Malone would impose on it. 87 This point is well
illustrated by the Eastern District of Michigan's decision in TC.G.
88
Detroit v. City of Dearborn.
Addressing the issue of what kinds of fees subsection (c) permits,
the City of Dearborn court devised an intricate test that explicitly allows
municipalities to collect gross-receipts-based fees from wireline
companies for use of public rights-of-way. 89 In arriving at this holding,
the court in no way relied on the legislative history of the Stupak-Barton
amendment. 90 As noted in Rights-of-Way Redux, the City of Dearborn
court's tortured analysis, in the end, relied heavily on its
misunderstanding of the St. Louis cases. The court, however, did look to
the legislative history to explicate the subsection's "competitively neutral
and nondiscriminatory" language. 91
If the legislative history
"unambiguously" evidenced congressional approval of revenue-based
fees, it is odd that the court chose notto rely on it for both its efforts at
statutory interpretation. Had the court agreed with Mr. Malone that the
legislative history sheds light on the fees issue, perhaps it would have
taken this easier way to reaching its holding than the one it chose.
There is a good explanation for why the court took the hard road.
The City of Dearborn court's discussion of the legislative history
indicates that it did not think that it supported the proposition that
subsection (c) permits municipalities to seek revenue-based rents from
wireline companies for use of the public rights-of-way. 92 The court
explained that, "[a]s can be clearly seen from Representative Stupak's
comments, the parity provision was defeated because it did not allow a
local government to distinguish between providers based on their varying

Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788-91 (E.D. Mich. 1998), affd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir.
2000); see also AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc. v. City of Eugene,
35 P.3d 1029, 1047-48 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (failing to reach fees issue because the court
held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that city ordinance violated section 253(a)),
review denied, 52 P.3d 1056 (Or. 2002); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of
Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804, 808 (S.C. 1999) (finding that a "franchise fee equal to a
percentage of the revenue generated is not inherently unfair or unreasonable as a measure
of the franchise's value as a business asset to the franchisee").
87. See supra notes 83-84.
88. 16 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
89. ld.at 788-91.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 792.
92. Id.
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use of the right-of-ways., 93 The court did not accept the inference that
Mr. Malone draws from the defeat of the parity provision.
V.

Conclusion

Mr. Malone notes that the Second Circuit in 7. C.G. New York, Inc.
v. City of White Plains,94 decided after Rights-of-Way Redux was written
but before it was published, declined to reach the central issues addressed
in this debate, finding the issues "difficult." 95 Rights-of-Way Redux and
this brief rejoinder are efforts to bring some clarity to these issues so they
are less difficult. A full understanding of the historical common law
regarding municipal streets, the actual, limited significance of St. Louis I,
the faulty reliance on St. Louis I that drove the analysis in City of
Dearborn and its progeny, and the meaning of the language and
legislative history of section 253 of the Telecommunications Act-all of
these insights will aid courts in moving to consistent results in municipal
wireline fee cases.

93.
94.
95.

Id.
305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. 2003).
Id. at 79.

